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CORPORATIONS-RESERVED POWER-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.
The famous Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheaton 518, holding
that the charter from a state to a private corporation is a contract in
the sense of the provision of the Federal Constitution, forbidding a
state to impair 'the obligation of a contract, was an epoch-making
decision in the legal history of our country. It was feared that the
logical effect of this holding would be to build up corporate power
which might become so strong as to menace governmental power
itself. Hence, when the effect of this decision began to result in
practical inconveniences, the legislatures, in practically every state,
granted charters, whether special or granted under general incorpo-
ration laws, with the reservation of the right to "alter, amend or
repeal" or to "alter, repeal or suspend" or similar words, without
any limitation.
The decision handed down in Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 91
Pac. 369, by the Supreme Court of Utah, is not only important on
account of the most careful study and thought, evidenced in the
opinion, but also illustrative as showing the decided trend of mod-
em authority. The case draws clearly the distinction between the
contract of the corporation with the state and the contract of the
corporation with the stockholders, as evidenced by the charter. The
holding is that any statute, authorizing the majority of stockholders
to amend the articles of incorporation against the consent of the
minority so as to make non-assessable full-paid stock, assessable and
subject to sale for such assessment, affects the contractual relations
of the corporation and the stockholders and as such, impairs the
obligation of a contract within the prohibition of the Federal Consti-
tution, although the State Constitution provides that all laws relat-
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ing to corporations, may be altered, repealed or amended by the
legislature.
All authorities agree that there is a limitation upon the power
thus reserved by the various constitutions and statutes but there
has been a conflict as to the proper construction of the reservation.
Clark & Marshall's Priv. Corp., Vol. 3, No. 631, f. However, the
effect is, at least, to reserve to the legislature, the power to make
any alteration or amendment of a character'subj ect to it, which will
not defeat or substantially imp'air the object of the grant or any
vested right under the grant and which the legislature may deem
necessary to carry into effect the purpose of the corporation or to
protect the rights of the public or the stockholders and creditors
or to promote the due administration of its affairs. Sinking Fund
Cases, 99 U. S. 700; N. Y. & New England R. R. Co., 151 U. S.
556. The United States Supreme Court in Shield v. Ohio, 95 U. S.
319 , laid down the general rule that an alteration in a charter of the
corporation made by the State in the exercise of its reserve power,
must be reasonable and made in good faith and be consistent with
the scope and object of the act of incorporation. The State, how-
ever, has no power to make any material or essential alteration in
the contract between the members themselves and the corporation.
Memphis Branch R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 617; R. R. Co. v.
Hodgens, 77 Pa. St. I9o.
For instance, where a general incorporation act reserved to the
State the right to alter, repeal or amend the same at pleasure and an
act was subsequently passed, reducing the rates which the company
was authorized to charge, a subsequent increase was unlawful.
State v. Consolidation Coal Co., 46 Md. i. Where the Legislature
reserved this right, it may under such power apply a general law
regulating the liability of railroad companies for stock killed. Jef-
fersonville R. R. Co. v. Gabbert, 25 Ind. 431; Perrin v. Oliver, i
Minn. 202. Where an act granting a ferry charter, reserved the
right of amendment, such charter, although providing that no other
ferry should be established within two miles of the one authorized,
may be amended by limiting the exclusive right to a quarter of a
mile along the shore. In all these cases the relations of the stock-
holders were affected in a manner detrimental to the stockholders,
but the public interest was held to preponderate over such consid-
erations. All questions of doubt are to be solved in favor of the
State in such cases. E. Saginaw Salt Mfg. Co. v. E. Saginaw, 19
Mich. 259; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Canal CoWrs. 21 Pa. St. 22.
New Jersey in the leading case of Zabriski v. Hackensack R. R:
Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, supports the decision of the Utah court in
refusing to allow the relations of stockholders as between them-
selves, to be materially altered under the guise of an amendment to
the charter. To allow an assessment against paid-up stock and for-
feiture or sale thereof for non-payment, would involve too violent
an invasion of property and contract rights. City of Detroit v.
Howell Plank Road Co., 55 N. W. 279 (Mich.); Cooke Stockhold-
ers, Stock and Corporation Law, Par. 492. Although as stated,
these cases illustrate the modem tendency in this matter, there are
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very strong decisions supporting the other side of the argument.
Hincklev v. Schvarzchild and Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, a
leading N. Y. case holds that acts, which do no more than regulate
and control the internal management of a corporation so far as
it has relation to the public and concerns the policy of the State, are
within the power to alter and repeal, even although the exercise of
the power adds to the burden of the stockholder by increasing his
liability, diminishing the value of his stock or by changing the name,
offices or proportion in control of the corporation. On this ground,
the court held valid a decree of the legislature, permitting a domues-
tic stock corporation whose certificate of incorporation did not pro-
vide for the issuing of preferred stock, to issue such stock upon
obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the stockholders. The issue
of such stock concededly changed the character and value of the
original stock by subordinating it to the preferred issue. Such
laws are permitted on the ground that it was a part of the contract
that such acts might be done. Buffalo & N. Y. City R. R. Co. v.
Dudley, 14 N. Y. 347. The mere production of inequality in shares
of stock does not avail to defeat either vested or contract rights.
Smith v. Atchison, T. & S., F. R. Co., 64 Fed. 272. A similar
decision in Vermont proceeds upon the ground that the issue of
preferred stock is a provision, mainly for the object of raising money
for the purposes of the corporation. Rutland & Burlington R. R.
Co. v. Thrall, 35 Vt. 536. In the States following this latter doc-
trine, the fact that every purchaser of stock in the company has
agreed to accept and hold his shares, when he knows of the reserva-
tion and of the consequent liability of change, outweighs any con-
sideration of the disturbance of vested rights. That this minority
view is, however, disappearing, seems to be evidenced by the dicta
of several judges in the cases cited, to the effect that weight of
authority rather than principle controlled their decisions.
INNKEEPER-LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEES' INSULTS TO GUESTS
Does the relation that exists between the keeper of a hotel and
his guest make the former liable for any misconduct of his em-
ployees by which the guest is injured while in the hotel and in his
care? Does an innkeeper owe the same degree of care to his guests
that a common carrier does to his passengers? In the recent case
of De Wolf v. Ford, io4 N. Y. Supp. 876, it was held, McLaughlin
dissenting, that an innkeeper is not liable on his implied contract to
protect his guests from insults by employees for the act of his ser-
vant in entering in the night-time the room of a female guest against
her protest, and, in the presence of others, using towards her insult-
ing language, and charging -her with immoral conduct.
It is conceded that the liability of both carrier and innkeeper for
the property of the passenger or guest is that of insurer, but the dis-
tinction is not so clear as to their responsibility for the person of the
passenger or guest. The general principle that a master is liable
for injuries to third persons resulting from the negligence of his
servant while in the line of his employment, and is not responsible
for the wilful and tortious acts of his servants committed outside
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the scope of employment, is nowhere controverted. Cooley on
Torts, 533 ff. Nor do the cases hold that either a carrier or inn-
keeper is an insurer as to the safety of the person. The question
always is whether the servant were acting within the scope of his
employment. And here a distinction is made. (a) In the case of
the common carrier the logical and necessary result of their relation
is that every servant of the carrier, every conductor, brakeman, por-
ter, who is employed to assist in transportation is constantly acting
within the scope and course of employment while he is on the train
or boat. Any negligent or wilful act of such servant which inflicts
injury on the passenger is necessarily a breach of the master's con-
tract of safe carriage for which the latter must respond. Bass v.
Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 36 Wis. 450; Mallach v. Ridley,.24 Abb.
N. C. 172. (b) So, while there are loose statements in the books to
the effect that common carriers and innkeepers have a similar lia-
bility, the limits, even if we concede this, are not the same. The car-
rier of persons is bound to exercise the utmost vigilance and care;
the innkeeper ordinary care only. And the reason for this dis-
tinction seems to be (I) That there is more likelihood of danger to
the person from the nature of the carrier's business, and (2) That
the passenger necessarily surrenders to the carrier all control and
dominion of his person. Therefore, when the servants of the inn-
keeper are not engaged in the course of employment, though they
may be present in the hotel, they are not performing the master's
contract and he is not liable for their negligent or wilful acts.
Curtis v. Dinneen, 4 Dak. 245; Wade v. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578; Weeks
v. McNulty, ioI Tenn. 499; Sandys v. Florence, 47 L. J. C. P. N. S.
598.
But it is claimed that recent cases have changed the liability of
the innkeeper to that of insurer. The first cases quoted are those
of Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, and Curran v. Olson, 88
Minn. 307. In each of these a saloon-keeper was held bound to use
reasonable care to protect his guests from injury at the hands of
lawless persons in the saloon. So in Mastad v. Swedish Brethren,
83 Minn. 4o, the owner of a picnic-ground was held to the exer-
cise of reasonable care to protect patrons and was liable for failure
therefor. In Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, the manager of a
theater was held liable for the wilful act of one of the servants act-
ing within his employment. In each of these cases the court was
clearly correct in holding the innkeeper, saloon-keeper, or manager
liable for negligence or carelessness, and not one is put upon the
ground, or goes so far as to hold, that an innkeeper is an insurer of
the safety of his guest's person. In Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn.
221, Story, J., following Shaw, C. J., in Comm. v. Power, 7 Met.
6oi, said: "An owner of a steamboat or railroad in this respect is in
a condition somewhat similar to that of an innkeeper whose prem-
ises are open to all guests. Yet he is not only empowered but is
bound so to regulate his house, as well with regard to the peace and
comfort of his guests who there seek repose, as to the peace and
quiet of the vicinity, as to repress and prohibit all disorderly con-
duct therein." But these oft-quoted words fall far short of justi-
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Lying the conclusion that he is liable as an insurer of the safety of his
guest's person. It cannot be denied, however, that the recent case
of Clancy v. Barker, 71 'Neb. 83, does hold an innkeeper liable as
an insurer of the person, regardless of whether the servant were
acting within the scope of his authority. But upon the same state
of facts, in Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed. 161, in another suit, the Cir-
cuit Court, per Sanborn, in a well-considered opinion, held the inn-
keeper not liable for the servant's tortious act where not done in
the scope of his employment. Therefore, with the exception of the
Court of Nebraska, while the distinctions are not always clearly
drawn, it nowhere appears that an innkeeper is held to insure the
person of his guest against the acts of his servants when beyond the
line of their authority.
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
No .recent decision of the United States Supreme Court has been
a source of greater interest than the case of Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U. S. 46. Aside from its importance as a controversy between two
sovereign states, it is especially noteworthy on account of the claims
put forward on the part of the Federal Government.
Kansas brought in the Supreme Court a suit to restrain Colorado
from diverting the water of the Arkansas River for the irrigation of
lands in Colorado. It was contended that this artificial diversion
diminished the natural and customary flow of the river into and
through Kansas. Then it was that the United States filed an inter-
vening petition claiming the right to control the waters of the river
to aid in the reqlamation of arid lands.
The argument of counsel for the government was unique. It
was contended that the control of such a stream valuable for irri-
gation purposes was necessary for the furtherance of the govern-
ment's policy as to irrigation. This being conceded, the Federal
Government would properly have control of such a stream under
that provision of the Constitution which gives Congress all the inci-
dental and instrumental powers necessary and proper to carry into
execution all the express powers. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 18.
See Story on Const., Sec. 1243.
This brought up for the consideration of the court the question
as to whether the right to reclaim arid lands was one of the powers
granted to Congress by the Constitution. No proposition of con-
stitutional law is more thoroughly settled than that the Federal Gov-
ernment is a government of delegated powers. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, i Wheat. 304; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i; McCulloch v.
Md., 9 Wheat. 316. And the right to legislate for the reclamation
of arid lands, aside from those the ownership of which is vested in
the Federal Government, is not one of the powers expressly dele-
gated to Congress.
Unable to rely upon this point counsel for the government next
endeavored to sustain the right of Congress to legislate for an inter-
state stream, which is not navigable, by "the doctrine of sovereign
and inherent power." Their argument was in substance: All
legislative power must be vested in either the state or the National
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Government; no legislative powers can belong to a state government
other than those which affect solely the internal affairs of that state;
consequently all powers which are national in their scope must be
found vested in the Congress of the United States.
This argument has a certain plausibility. The framers of the
Constitution, in delegating power to the Federal Government, un-
doubtedly intended to give to it all those powers which are essen-
tially national and to leave to the states all those which are essen-
tially local. In following this line of cleavage they used general
terms in both grants and prohibitions; for, in framing a constitu-
tion and not a code, they were providing for unforeseen contingen-
cies. 3 Work's of Wilson 282. The generality of these provisions
of grant and restriction has made possible the ever-broadening field
of Federal power. Cooley's Constitutional Laze, io6. This pro-
gressiveness of constitutional interpretation has long been recog-
nized and even a comparison of the statements of abstract princi-
ples shows the advance. What was once the test of the powers of
the Federal Government would not justify the use of some of the
powers which to-day are exercised without question. The test as
laid down by Justice Story was: "Whenever a question arises con-
cerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the first question
is whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be,
then the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry
must be whether it is properly an incident to an express power and
necessary to its execution. If it be, then it may be exercised by
Congress. If not, Congress can not exercise it." Story's Com-
mentaries on Constitution, Sec. 1243.
This test is, in one regard at least, much broadened by the lan-
guage of the Legal Tender Cases: "It is not indispensable to the
existence of any power claimed by the Federal Government that it
can be found specified in the words of the Constitution, or clearly
or directly traceable to some one of the specified powers. Its exist-
ence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the substantive
powers expressly defined or from them all combined. It is allow-
able to group together any number of them and infer from them all
that the power claimed has been conferred." Legal Tender Cases,
12 Wall. 534.
This is one of the most avowedly liberal constructions that the
Constitution has ever received yet it is hard to find in reasoning
such as this anything which would tend to justify the doctrine of
inherent powers.
On the other hand such a doctrine seems expressly negatived,
for as Justice Brewer says in Kansas v. Colorado: "This natural
construction of the original body of the Constitution is made abso-
lutely certain by the Tenth Amendment. This amendment which
was seemingly adopted with prescience of just such contention as
the present, disclosed the widespread fear that the National Gov-
ernment might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare,
attempt to exercise powers which had not been granted. It reads:
'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respect-
COMMENTS
ively or to the people.' The argument of counsel ignores the princi-
pal factor in this article, to wit: 'the people.' Its principal purpose
was not the distribution of power between the United States and the
States, but a reservation to the people of all power not granted.
. . . The powers affecting internal affairs of the States not
granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, and all
powers of a national character which are not delegated to the
National Government by the Constitution are reserved to the peo-
ple of the United States."
Such a reservation of powers as Article X assumes added im-
portance when it is remembered that it is not to be narrowed by a
technical construction but, like grants of power, is to be considered
liberally so as to give full effect to its scope and meaning. Weston
v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Robbins z. Shelby County Taxing Dis-
trict, 120 U. S. 489; Fairbank v. U. S. 181 U. S. 283.
The petition of the government being disposed of, the court
found that the damage done Kansas by the diversion of the water
of the river had not been sufficient to justify the granting of an
order restraining Colorado from using the water for irrigation pur-
poses.
The soundness of the doctrine reiterated by this case has long
been apparent; and the enunciation of such views at this time is
opportune as serving to bring vividly before the country the temper
and conservatism of the Supreme Court. The forcible emphasis
laid by the court upon the fact that ours is a government of dele-
gated powers may serve as a significant hint to the numerous advo-
cates of a further extension of Federal power. Also, it is conjec-
tured, this decision will not be without its effect upon those who
favor amending the Constitution.
THE POWER OF TILE LEGISLATURE OF A STATE OVER ANIMALS FERXE
NATUR.E IN CAPTIVITY.
The doctrine of the ownership of wild game is, without doubt,
an interesting one and a new phase of the question was brought up
in the case of Dieterich v. Fargo, 104 N. Y. Sup. 334. Judge
Houghton, in delivering the opinion of the court, decreed that the
term "deer and venison," in a statute forbidding, with a few excep-
tions, its transportation, included deer bought by the plaintiff in
another state and kept in a fenced park. He applied the term
"domestic" to such deer, but seemed to doubt the propriety of doing
so. Judge Lambert dissented from the opinion of the court on the
ground that the statute should not be construed as changing the
common law any more than necessary and that the statute should
be given the same effect as if it read "wild" deer.
It seems to be a well-decided doctrine of American law that the
wild game within a state belongs to the people in their collective
sovereign capacity. The case of ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 407,
after stating the above doctrine goes on to say that wild game is not
the subject of private ownership except in so far as the people may
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elect to make it so; and they may, if they see fit, absolutely pro-
hibit the taking of it, or traffic and commerce in it if it is deemed
necessary for the protection or preservation of the public good.
This doctrine cannot be said to be the meat of the discussion in the
present case, but it is important that it be borne in mind in our short
review of the subject.
It may be interesting to view for a moment the ownership
of game from a historical standpoint in order to ascertain how far
animals fera, nature are capable of domestication and to understand
how it is that the court can decree that the game laws shall cover
deer in captivity.
Animals ferae nature were regarded by the Romans as belonging
in common to the citizens of the state, and Merlin in saying
(R~pertoire de Jurisprudence, vol. 4, P. 128) that "Solon, seeing that
the Athenians gave themselves up to the chase, to the neglect of the
mechanical arts, forbade the killing of game," shows that such own-
ership was recognized in an even earlier political community.
The theory of the civil law is best illustrated by a passage from
Pothier's Trait du Droit de PropritY, Nos. 27-28. He says that
"In France, as well as in all other civilized countries of Europe, the
civil law has restrained the liberty which the pure law of nature
gave to everyone to capture animals who being in naturali la.xritate,
belong to no person in particular. The sovereigns have reserved
to themselves and to those to whom they judge proper to transmit it,
the right to hunt all game, and have forbidden hunting to other
persons."
In England Blackstone says: "Every man from the prince to the
peasant has an equal right of pursuing and taking to his own use all
such creatures as are ferae nature . . . but this natural right
as well as many others belonging to a man as an individual may be
restrained by positive laws enacted for reasons of state or the sup-
posed benefit of the community." 2 Bl. Comm. 410. "Undoubt-
edly this attribute of government to control the taking of animals
fera nature, which was recognized and enforced by the common
law of England, was vested in the colonial governments, where not
denied by their charters, or in conflict with grants of the royal
prerogatives. It is also certain that the power which the colonies
thus possessed passed to the States with the separation from the
mother country, and remains in them at the present day, in so far
as its exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the
rights conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.'"
Geer v. Conn., i6i U. S. 528.
The present instance of deer in a park is an illustration of the
qualified property in animals fere nature per industriam hominis.
2 Blackstone 391. This qualified ownership in an individual is not
inconsistent with the theory of the ownership of wild animals being
in the state for the benefit of the people in common. This is true
because the police power still gives the state a method of control
over the deer and moreover, this ownership continues only while
they are within the particular person's power, and if at any time
they regain their natural liberty, his property instantly ceases; unless
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they have animum revertendi; which is only to be known by their
usual custom of returning. 2 Blackstone 382. It can hardly be
claimed the deer in the present case have this animum revertendi
and their wild nature is little if any changed. Moreover, they come
within Bouvier's definition of game as being "Birds or beasts of a
wild nature, obtained by fowling and hunting."
So it would seem that they were still animals ferw natura and
would be covered by the statute even if the term "wild" were read
into it before "deer and venison" as the plaintiff maintained it should
be. But the court decided that the statute was undoubedly meant
to cover such cases as this, where the deer were animals fere nat-
ure but in captivity.
It must be acknowledged however, that, while they are under a
person's control, they are as much under the protection of the law
as if they were absolutely and indefeasibly his, 2 Bl. Comm. 393;
and yet the police power residing in a state gives it control over the
game within it, Geer v. Conn.,supra; and the deer in captivity would,
without doubt, be subject to such power. For even granting they
are domesticated they would be within Bouvier's definition of game
given above.
The principal case decides that the statute means domesticated as
well as wild deer. Moreover, the deer did not lose their character
as game by being in a park and it is, according to our theories,
within the power of a state to exercise control over its game by
reason of its police power. The plaintiff's property right was
therefore subject to this power of control.
